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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, which requested the Secretary-General to:

> "submit to it by 31 January 1993 a further report on the situation in Angola, together with his longer-term recommendations for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process, which should be clearly defined in scope and time and based on a wide degree of support in Angola."

I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

2. Following Mr. Savimbi's withdrawal from Luanda to Huambo in October 1992 and the events of 31 October to 1 November 1992, there was no direct contact between the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) and the Government. As a result of meetings which my Special Representative had with Mr. Savimbi on 24 November 1992 and with President dos Santos the following day, agreement was reached to hold the first high-level encounter between both sides since the last meeting of the Joint Political-Military Commission (JPMC) on 31 October 1992. The United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) organized this meeting in Namibe, on 26 November 1992, and provided helicopters to transport the UNITA delegation there from Huambo.

3. The meeting took place in a good atmosphere and succeeded beyond expectations. The two delegations agreed quickly on a six-point agenda, embracing the implementation of the Peace Accords; the future United Nations mandate; the remodelling of JPMC; conditions for participation of UNITA deputies in the new Parliament and of UNITA members in the new Government of National Reconciliation and Unity; release of UNITA leaders held by the Government and hand-over of corpses; and the holding by UNITA of a meeting of

its Political Commission. The meeting also published a joint declaration, reconfirming both sides' adherence to the Peace Accords and calling for the effective application of the cease-fire in all parts of the country, the immediate cessation of offensive movements and the extension and strengthening of UNAVEM's mandate. On the latter point, it was further agreed that both sides would submit a joint list of tasks to my Special Representative by 29 November 1992, and that they would meet again the following week to take up the other items on the agenda. I issued a statement welcoming this development, as did the Security Council in paragraph 3 of its resolution 793 (1992) of 30 November 1992, while at the same time urging the Government and UNITA "to take immediate and effective actions in accordance with the declaration".

4. This apparent breakthrough was short-lived. On 29 November 1992, UNITA troops occupied Uige, the capital of the province of the same name, as well as the neighbouring town of Negage, the site of an important air-base. During the fighting, the UNAVEM camp was caught in cross-fire and a United Nations police observer, Sergeant Adilson Barbosa Costa (Brazil) was killed. In my statement at the Security Council's informal meeting on 30 November 1992, I deeply deplored these serious violations of the Peace Accords and appealed strongly to both parties to cease hostilities and to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis through dialogue. On the same day, Mr. Savimbi telephoned my Special Representative to express regret over the observer's death and UNITA's military action in Uige and Negage, which he said had been undertaken by his commanders without his authority. He promised that UNITA would immediately withdraw from these areas, in order to try to save the process of dialogue begun in Namibe. UNITA confirmed this intention officially to the Foreign Minister of Angola on 1 December 1992.

5. Efforts to bring this about and restore the situation to that prevailing on 29 November 1992 consumed a significant part of UNAVEM's time and energies during the succeeding weeks. The Government rejected an initial proposal that a joint delegation of the Government, UNITA and UNAVEM, in traditional JPMC mode, should go to Uige to supervise and verify the withdrawal, insisting that UNAVEM alone should be responsible for certifying that the operation had been fully completed. UNAVEM facilitated direct communication between the two sides through its radio network and transported and accompanied senior UNITA military officers to Uige. Three visits were made there, on 4, 17 and 21 December 1992. The Government had indicated its intention to join the last two but, in the event, did not do so. General Dembo, the newly appointed Vice-President of UNITA, stayed on in the region after the last of these visits in order to supervise the withdrawal personally. A persistent problem arose from the Government's insistence that UNAVEM must guarantee that no UNITA troops remained in the two towns, an impossible task given the small strength of the UNAVEM teams monitoring the withdrawal *in situ* and the facility with which military personnel could disguise themselves in civilian clothing. Eventually, on 27 December 1992, the Government sent 2 officers and about 200 troops of the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to satisfy themselves that the withdrawal was complete and prepare the reinstatement of government administration. Arrangements were made to count, on 31 December 1992, the

UNITA troops which had withdrawn to two assembly areas nearby, with UNAVEM verifying the count, an additional government condition for resolving the crisis. At the last moment, however, UNITA refused to let this operation proceed, alleging that its troops had been attacked by FAA three times as they withdrew and that General Dembo's motorcade had been ambushed near Uige. This episode is recounted at some length to illustrate the difficulties UNAVEM has faced in getting the two sides to cooperate with it in implementing even simple local agreements.

6. Meanwhile, the situation in other parts of the country had become increasingly tense. UNITA extended its hold over more municipalities, including two provincial capitals, Caxito and N'dalatando: by 3 January 1993, before the current bout of hostilities began, it had occupied 104 municipalities, out of a total of 164, compared with 57 at the time of my last report (S/24858); as of 20 January 1993, the number is 105, including another provincial capital, M'banza Congo. Meanwhile, the Government was stepping up its public criticism of UNITA, adopting harder positions and making preparations to retaliate militarily by strengthening its military and police presence in the main cities and distributing arms to civilians. Both sides exchanged accusations and counteraccusations and issued a series of documents stating their conditions for the resumption of political negotiations. In meetings with my Special Representative, President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi continued to reiterate their commitment to peace and resumed negotiations, but their actions showed them to be on a collision course.

7. Deeply concerned about this rapidly deteriorating situation, I telephoned both leaders on 12 December to suggest that they meet, under my auspices, in Geneva during the last week of December 1992, or alternatively, in Addis Ababa. Mr. Savimbi expressed readiness to accept, but President dos Santos said that, while he was willing to meet Mr. Savimbi, this would have to be in Luanda. I informed the Security Council about this démarche in a letter dated 18 December 1992 (S/24996). Following consultations, the President issued a statement on 22 December 1992 (S/25002), reiterating the Council's appeal for dialogue and respect for the Peace Accords and appealing to both leaders to accept my invitation to a joint meeting at an agreed location.

8. This appeal was not heeded. My Special Representative met with Mr. Savimbi in Huambo on 2 January 1993 and, later the same day, with the Angolan Foreign Minister in Luanda. The suggestion emerged that a meeting take place between the top military leaders on each side. The Government also indicated its intention to proceed to a second Namibe meeting, as early as the following week, as soon as the withdrawal of UNITA troops from Uige and Negage had been verified and they had been counted in their assembly areas.

9. The next day, however, fierce armed clashes broke out in Lubango. This was an unexpected place for large-scale hostilities to erupt, as a Joint Commission of government and UNITA representatives, formed with the help of UNAVEM, seemed to have been successful there in defusing tensions and establishing reasonable relations between the two sides. UNITA, claiming the

Government had started the fighting in Lubango, seized the FAA officers and troops who had been sent to Uige and Negage to resolve that situation. On 4 January 1993, I appealed through my Spokesman to both sides to ensure that there were no further violations of the cease-fire and that the dialogue begun in Namibe was immediately restored.

10. In a meeting on 5 January 1993, President dos Santos reaffirmed to my Special Representative his commitment to resumption of the Namibe talks, provided the Uige/Negage problem could be resolved. He requested new efforts in this regard. However, Mr. Savimbi told Miss Anstee that it was impossible to get his commanders to release the FAA captives, in the light of what had happened in Lubango. The only possibility left was a meeting between military leaders to bring about a cease-fire, to be followed, immediately afterwards, by political negotiations on all the fundamental issues, including the future of UNAVEM. Both sides agreed to this two-tiered approach and efforts then concentrated on finding a mutually acceptable place. I reported these efforts in a letter to the Security Council dated 8 January 1993 (S/25076). The Government preferred Luanda, but this was not acceptable to UNITA. After agreement also proved impossible on a series of other possible venues inside Angola, a compromise was agreed: Addis Ababa, under UNAVEM auspices, at the headquarters of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA).

11. Arrangements were made by UNAVEM to hold this meeting over the weekend of 16 and 17 January 1993 but, on 14 January, UNITA modified its position, insisting that political talks must take place at the same time as the military meeting and presenting five points for discussion. This was unexpected, as Mr. Savimbi had repeatedly appealed to my Special Representative to organize the military meeting as a matter of urgency and a precursor to political talks. A promised telephone call from Mr. Savimbi to my Special Representative on 15 January never took place, and, despite repeated efforts, she has been unable to contact him since. The meeting therefore remains in suspense as of 20 January 1993. On 17 January, General "Ben-Ben", Chief of FALA General Staff published a communiqué, implying that further negotiations would depend on the outcome of the fighting.

12. In recent telephone conversations with Mr. Savimbi, I strongly impressed on him the need to send UNITA military representatives to Addis Ababa to discuss cease-fire arrangements and, after some consultations, Mr. Savimbi agreed to do so. Meanwhile, on 21 January 1993, the Permanent Representative of Angola hand-delivered to me a letter of the same date from President dos Santos, in which he asked me to recommend to the Security Council that UNAVEM II's mandate be extended in order to ensure full implementation of the Peace Accords for Angola. In his letter, the President emphasized that the escalation of military action throughout the country justified the need to bring UNAVEM's mandate up to date and to strengthen its presence in Angola, according to "modalities to be agreed upon". The Permanent Representative also informed me that on 19 January 1993 his Foreign Minister had sent a letter to Mr. Savimbi in which the Government asserted that it had never excluded the need for a political meeting similar to that

held in Namibe and stated its acceptance of UNITA's "proposal for a political-military meeting" in Addis Ababa. The letter also listed certain basic premises for this meeting to take place. I can only hope that the reaction of Mr. Savimbi to these latest proposals will be positive.

13. The fighting which began in Lubango on 3 January 1993 spread quickly to other provincial capitals and towns, virtually throughout the country: Benguela, Lobito, Namibe, Saurimo, Luena, Kuito-Bie, Huambo, Menongue, Cuito Canavale, M'banza Congo and Soyo. While both sides claimed provocation by the other, there appeared to be a planned offensive to drive UNITA from the main cities. This plan was largely successful in the initial stages, but UNITA obtained control of Cuito Canavale and M'banza Congo and the important oil-producing centre of Soyo, in addition to Caxito and N'dalatando, which, as of 20 January 1993, the Government was still trying to recover. A fierce battle is reportedly still raging for Huambo and the situation in other cities is tense and precarious. As indicated in my report of 25 November 1992, reports persist that civilians armed by the Government have participated in the killings of thousands of UNITA supporters in Luanda and other major cities, while there are also reports of killings of government supporters and officials in the areas controlled by UNITA. These reports, as well as accounts of widespread human rights violations by both sides, further complicate the already tense political and security situation. To all intents and purposes, Angola has returned to civil war, and is probably in an even worse situation than that which prevailed before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991. The conflict has now engulfed towns and centres of population in a way it never did during the previous 16 years. There are also disturbing but unconfirmed reports that, despite the triple zero provision in the Peace Accords, new supplies of arms may be entering Angola.

14. Meanwhile, the Government has taken measures to set up an administration reflecting the results of the legislative election in September 1992. On 4 December 1992 a Government of National Unity, with Mr. Marcolino Moco (formerly Secretary-General of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)) as Prime Minister, was sworn in. Of 27 ministerial and state secretary posts, one (Minister of Cultural Affairs) was offered to UNITA, together with the vice-ministerial posts of defence, agriculture, public works and social assistance. UNITA accepted these posts and nominated incumbents, but they have not assumed their functions because of concerns about their security in Luanda in the prevailing situation. One ministerial post and six lesser positions were assigned to other parties that had won seats in the Assembly. The new parliament was installed on 26 November 1992 and has had several sessions, but the 70 members from UNITA who won seats have not taken them up, again because of security concerns. In accordance with the Electoral Law, President dos Santos remains as President until the run-off election between himself and Mr. Savimbi can take place. This was supposed to happen within 30 days of the announcement of the results of the first round (i.e. by 17 November 1992) but in present circumstances it is impossible to predict whether or when the run-off election will take place.

15. The widespread fighting and the absence of Government administration in much of the countryside and renewed destruction of an already ravaged infrastructure and transport system have led to widespread hunger and the flight of large numbers of people from towns involved in the conflict, who are now hiding in the bush or have joined the already large army of internally dislocated people in Angola in make-shift refugee camps. Former refugees from abroad who had been encouraged by the peace process to return, now wish to go back to their former places of exile. An already serious humanitarian situation has become catastrophic in many areas and the capacity of international humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to provide assistance has been severely disrupted by the conflict; it is being resumed where and whenever conditions permit.

II. ROLE AND SITUATION OF UNAVEM

16. The crisis that developed after the elections at the end of September 1992, notably the withdrawal of Mr. Savimbi to Huambo and the collapse of JPMC, thrust UNAVEM into a central mediating role. The mission has also had to provide air transport, radio and communications to facilitate negotiations between the Government and UNITA, including between military commanders in combat.

17. The representatives of the three observer countries to the Peace Accords, Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, which have special responsibilities in the peace process, continued to play an active role and have issued a number of helpful statements. But their role has inevitably been hampered by the difficulties of establishing direct contact with UNITA. Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, the United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited Angola in December 1992 and met President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. A high-level Organization of African Unity (OAU) delegation, headed by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, visited Angola in late December 1992 and had extensive discussions with President dos Santos and the Government but was not able to see Mr. Savimbi in Huambo. A subsequent visit to him by representatives of Zimbabwe and Cape Verde, planned for 8 January 1993, to issue an invitation on behalf of their Presidents to a meeting in a southern African location outside Angola, had to be cancelled at the last moment because of deteriorating security in Huambo.

18. Although UNAVEM has thus been cast, de facto, into the role of principal mediator, it too has been seriously affected by the disastrous events of the last six weeks. The suspension of dialogue after the Namibe meeting on 26 November 1992 made it impossible to get the two parties to present their joint list of tasks that they would like an enlarged UNAVEM to perform. My Special Representative accordingly submitted to them on 24 December 1992 a comprehensive discussion paper incorporating the proposals that each had put forward in their own separate papers, and proposing options for compromise in areas where their approach differed. A copy of that paper is annexed hereto.

UNITA has given some comments in reply and the Government is understood to have taken a position on the UNAVEM paper but has not yet made it known to my Special Representative. In any case, it cannot be finalized without a meeting between the two parties.

19. With the outbreak of violent and widespread hostilities, and the collapse at all levels of the joint monitoring mechanisms between the two signatories to the Peace Accords, UNAVEM II's original mandate has become less and less relevant. Even its role of mediating between the parties at the national and local levels has been increasingly limited by the deteriorating security situation, which, combined with uncertainties about the future, has also made it impossible to restore the mission's full strength as proposed in paragraph 61 of my report of 25 November 1992 (S/24858). As of 20 January 1993 the mission has only 247 military observers instead of 350, and 87 police observers instead of 126. The civilian electoral/political observers have also been reduced to a bare minimum of nine, by delaying the return of those who had gone on leave over the Christmas period.

20. At the same time, UNAVEM teams in the field have had to face mounting dangers. As already mentioned, a police observer has been killed in Uige and others have been wounded. UNAVEM's prefabricated tented camps are extremely vulnerable to gunfire and casualties would have been higher had the precaution not been taken of digging slit trenches, in which many observers have had to spend several days and nights consecutively. The dangers have been exacerbated by both sides' public criticism of UNAVEM, which has been held responsible for not having been able to prevent the new conflict - a charge which reveals profound misunderstanding (or deliberate distortion) of the mission's mandate and of the capacity of a handful of unarmed observers to control two large and heavily armed forces. Teams have been driven by hostile crowds from Dundo, a Government-held town, and from many UNITA locations, in one of which two United Nations military observers were badly beaten. Protests have been lodged in each case. In Lubango, a UNITA member of the Joint Commission, who had sought sanctuary in the UNAVEM camp during the fighting, was shot on the spot by government police who took away his two companions; President dos Santos later apologized personally. Similar incidents occurred in N'dalatando and Negage where UNITA abducted a government policeman and members of the joint monitoring commission from the UNAVEM camps. United Nations aircraft have been fired upon, and one helicopter was shot down in Huambo on 30 October 1992, though fortunately without loss of life; the crew was beaten by UNITA.

21. As part of its contingency planning, UNAVEM had prepared a detailed plan for the temporary redeployment or closure of some of its locations and, in the longer term, for a more general withdrawal if circumstances so dictated. In the week of 11 January 1993, however, fighting became so extensive that 45 of UNAVEM's 67 locations, including the Regional Command at Huambo, have had to be evacuated. This was a major logistic operation, effected mainly by air and often under risky conditions. Every effort was made to save as much equipment as possible and to disable remaining vehicles and communications equipment, but much had to be left behind and will be difficult to recover, if and when

the teams return. At least 46 4x4 vehicles, 1 fork-lift truck and 1 water trailer are known to be in the hands of UNITA, many of them taken by force. Withdrawal is continuing from some of UNAVEM's remaining locations, where the situation continues very tense. As a result of these developments, UNAVEM can no longer monitor the course of events adequately, much less try to guide them in the direction of reconciliation and dialogue.

III. LOGISTICS, FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

22. The rapid withdrawal dictated by the above-mentioned circumstances from 45 locations (as of 20 January 1993) has resulted in an inventoried loss of approximately US$ 2.7 million for Weatherhaven prefabricated shelters damaged in cross-fire, left behind due to hurried withdrawal or lack of air transport or looted following UNAVEM's departure. Fifty-eight vehicles worth $894,000, 53 generators worth $387,000, a variety of communications equipment worth $688,000 and miscellaneous equipment worth $478,000 have had to be abandoned for the same reasons. Losses to date are estimated to total approximately $5.2 million. No accurate estimate of replacement values can be given without return to the sites, to retrieve worthwhile material and assess whether repair or write-off is the most cost-effective approach. It is not known whether, and if so when, this will be possible. A board of inquiry has been convened to consider these losses. A substantial increase in compensation claims for loss or damage to personal effects is also expected.

23. Abandonment of equipment was usually the result of UNAVEM'S not being able to land C-130 or other large transport aircraft which could extract the vehicles and generators, or sudden heavy fighting which threatened the UNAVEM location and obliged immediate withdrawal with vehicles only. In several places, the forces in control locally, in particular UNITA, refused permission for UNAVEM II to extract equipment. Where possible, and when the security situation permitted, major equipment left behind was disabled by the removal of essential parts.

24. UNAVEM II is currently at phase III of its security plan, with only essential personnel in the country. The security situation of UNAVEM's headquarters site in Luanda is good, but that of the 22 remaining sites still occupied by 84 personnel up-country on 20 January 1993 is a source of concern and further evacuations may be necessary. Sufficient air resources are still available and on 24-hour stand-by to extract UNAVEM II personnel from any site should it be necessary. The major problem is to obtain landing permission from the forces controlling the area in question.

25. UNAVEM continues to assist members of the international community such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as other foreign nationals, to evacuate from up-country locations if time and transport facilities permit. Many requests for such help from foreign consulates have been met, including the airlift of a large number of expatriate personnel from the dam site at Capanda when it was overrun by UNITA and the provision of air

support to the search for those missing. UNAVEM's evacuation of ICRC, MSF and other personnel from places under heavy fire, such as Huambo and Kuito-Bie, almost certainly saved their lives. One United Nations military observer risked his own life in a gallant solo dash through cross-fire in Kuito to rescue MSF personnel.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

26. In spite of strenuous efforts by myself and my Special Representative, with the Security Council's support, the situation in Angola has continued to deteriorate since the adoption of resolution 793 (1992) on 30 November 1992. The civil war has resumed with all that that entails in human suffering and the further impoverishment of a potentially prosperous country. As reported above, it has been impossible for the United Nations to bring about even a cease-fire meeting between the two sides, let alone the sustained political dialogue needed to identify means of putting the peace process back on track and define an enlarged United Nations role that I could recommend to the Security Council. With great regret, therefore, I have come to the conclusion that there is no realistic prospect, in the immediate future, of UNAVEM being enlarged to fulfil the role envisaged in the discussion paper which my Special Representative made available to the two sides on 24 December 1992 (see annex).

27. If that conclusion is accepted, it is necessary to consider how far, if at all, the United Nations should involve itself in further efforts to end the civil war in Angola. It can be argued, indeed government spokesmen have argued, that, by refusing initially to accept the election results and withdrawing its generals from the new Angolan Armed Forces, as well as by its illegal occupation of large areas of the country, UNITA has removed itself from the Bicesse process and must be obliged, by force if necessary, to accept the authority of a duly elected Government. While in no way condoning UNITA's actions in defiance of agreements it has signed, I could not support such a position. What the vast majority of Angolans want, and the international community should assist them in achieving, is earliest peace in Angola and that objective will not be achieved by simply allowing the two sides to fight until one prevails or they again reach a stalemate. The varying fortunes of war have at different times made both sides reluctant to talk, but both the Government and UNITA have stated on numerous occasions that neither side can win a war. The continuing conflict could be prolonged and bloody and, in the end, inconclusive, so that the parties will have to come back to the negotiating table.

28. I accordingly believe that the international community should persist in trying to bring the two sides together, in helping them to reach agreements and in supporting, on the ground, implementation of whatever arrangements they agree on. But I would not recommend that scarce resources again be committed to a substantial field operation until each of the two sides has shown a greater readiness than heretofore to honour the commitments it has solemnly entered into. At the same time it would be necessary for the United Nations to remain more closely involved in the negotiation of arrangements for

completing the peace process than it was in the case of the Peace Accords of May 1991, in order to ensure that the role envisaged for it was feasible. Otherwise the Organization might again find itself being given responsibilities which were not adequate in relation to the complexities of the task or which it would not be able in practice to discharge.

29. Against this background, the Security Council has to take, not later than 31 January 1993, a decision on the future of UNAVEM II. I have identified three possible options which are outlined in paragraph 30 below. All assume that I would continue to have a Special Representative for Angola, who would be based in Luanda with the necessary civilian, military and police staff. The Special Representative's mandate would be essentially that which Miss Anstee has been carrying out since the elections, namely to use the United Nations good offices, in cooperation with interested Member States, to help the two sides to reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process in accordance with the Peace Accords and, meanwhile, to broker and, within the resources available, help to implement cease-fires at the national or local level. The Special Representative would continue to be in charge of all United Nations activities in connection with the peace process.

30. The three options are as follows:

(a) To maintain UNAVEM II at its current authorized strength (350 military observers, 126 police observers, 83 international civilian staff and 155 local staff) and try to re-establish its deployment as it was immediately after the elections, by stationing military, police and/or electoral observers at 67 different locations (more or less as in the map annexed to my report of 24 June 1992 (S/24145)). The rationale for such deployment would be to recreate the infrastructure needed for UNAVEM II to resume immediately the functions assigned to it under the Peace Accords;

(b) To reduce UNAVEM's provincial deployment to approximately six locations, perhaps along the lines of its current regional structure (regional headquarters at Saurimo, Luena, Mavinga, Lubango, Huambo and Luanda itself) but with adjustments to ensure that it was in the right places on the ground to support the Special Representative's peacemaking efforts. This option would require 75 military observers, 30 police observers and 49 international civilian staff;

(c) To confine UNAVEM II's deployment to Luanda for the present but with the capability to deploy one or two outstations if it became clear that this was required to support the Special Representative's peacemaking efforts and if security permitted such deployment. This option would require 30 military observers, 6 police observers and 28 international civilian staff.

Under option (b) or (c) it would be necessary to decide whether equipment surplus to the requirements of that option should be stored in Luanda, for eventual use by a relaunched UNAVEM operation, or transferred now to other peace-keeping operations, notably the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ).

31. In evaluating these options, the Security Council will wish to bear in mind that, as of 20 January 1993, UNAVEM II had been forced by the fighting to evacuate 45 of its locations, with the loss of 1 helicopter (damaged by cross-fire on the ground), 58 vehicles and much other equipment destroyed, stolen or looted. In the process members of UNAVEM II have suffered much harassment, including in some cases premeditated assault, by officials and supporters of both sides.

32. Given the improbability of early agreement on reinstatement of the military provisions of the Peace Accords, together with the security factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph, I do not recommend option (a). The choice between options (b) and (c) is a fine one. On balance, I recommend that the Security Council approve option (c) but that sufficient equipment be retained in Luanda for the time being to permit a subsequent move to option (b) if this should become desirable and feasible. If it accepts this recommendation, the Security Council might wish to establish a deadline with the stipulation that, if by that time it had not been possible to persuade the two parties to agree upon and observe a cease-fire and resume negotiations within the framework of the Peace Accords, then the mission would be withdrawn. This deadline could be 30 April 1993.

33. I shall, with my Special Representative, be examining in due course how far this tragic breakdown of the peace process in Angola was due to shortcomings in the mandate given to, or the performance of, the United Nations. But my present view is that the fundamental cause of the breakdown was the failure, often deliberate, of both parties to implement in full the provisions of the Peace Accords relating to political, military and police matters or to make the necessary efforts to promote national reconciliation. This failure greatly added to the difficulty, for the United Nations and other interested third parties, of preventing a slide back into civil war after UNITA further violated the Peace Accords by rejecting the results of an election certified by my Special Representative as having been generally free and fair, withdrawing from the new Angolan Armed Forces and seizing scores of municipalities. It is also necessary to point out that the deliberately limited role assigned by the two parties and the observers in the Peace Accords to UNAVEM II in military matters, which was only to verify the efficient working of joint monitoring mechanisms to be established and chaired by the parties themselves, hampered its ability to correct the drift towards non-compliance, which had already become apparent by late 1991.

34. One other matter which I find it necessary to underline now is the outrageous harassment and physical abuse to which UNAVEM II personnel have been subjected, together with the theft and looting of United Nations property, by officials and supporters of both sides but especially UNITA. When protests are made about such incidents, the leadership of both sides says that they result from unauthorized actions by uncontrolled elements. But the fact is that both parties, or media under their control, have, at one time or another in recent months, maliciously criticized UNAVEM II's performance and accused it of bias in favour of the other side. Such statements increase the likelihood that, when the situation deteriorates, "uncontrolled elements" will

use violence against United Nations personnel. This is an observation which is relevant to a number of other United Nations operations in which those who are serving the causes of peace and humanity, to the best of their ability and often at the risk of their own lives, are currently denied the respect and cooperation to which they are entitled.

35. In conclusion I again pay tribute to my Special Representative, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, to Brigadier-General Michael Nyambuya (Zimbabwe) who has acted as Chief Military Observer since Major-General Edward U. Unimna (Nigeria) returned to his country's service on 14 December 1992, and to all who have been serving under their command, for the exceptional courage and determination which they have shown in carrying out their duties in dangerous and discouraging circumstances.

Annex

Informal discussion paper on future mandate of UNAVEM

I. BACKGROUND

1. Both parties to the Bicesse Accords have formally indicated their interest in an extended and strengthened presence of UNAVEM. This was reflected in the joint Declaration of Namibe agreed by the Government and UNITA on 26 November 1992.

2. The original - and present - mandate of UNAVEM II expired on 31 October 1992. Two interim extensions, to 30 November 1992 and 31 January 1993, respectively, have been subsequently agreed by the Security Council, pending the presentation of long-term recommendations by the Secretary-General. These have now to be submitted, without fail, by the middle of January.

3. The Secretary-General has indicated his willingness to recommend to the Security Council a larger mandate and strength for UNAVEM II, but has stated that he could do this only "if the two sides had demonstrated their continuing commitments to the Bicesse Accords by agreeing to a realistic plan of action to get the implementation process back on track".

4. At the Namibe meeting on 26 November 1992 it was agreed that the two parties would send to the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Angola, by 29 November, a jointly agreed list of the tasks that the expanded mandate of UNAVEM would encompass, as a basis for estimating the numbers and types of personnel required, and the cost of the operation.

5. Unfortunately, subsequent events in Uige and Negage disrupted this process. Instead, both parties have presented separate documents defining their concepts. While there are a number of important areas of common agreement, there are also some significant differences which need to be urgently reconciled so that a firm proposal may go forward to the Secretary-General no later than the first week of January 1993.

6. Given these circumstances, both parties have agreed that UNAVEM should prepare a draft proposal, attempting to reconcile the two positions, as a basis for discussion at an early meeting between the two, in conjunction with UNAVEM, preferably in the last week of December 1992. This is the purpose of the present document.

II. BASIC PREMISES

7. In conformity with the position taken by the Secretary-General, as reflected in paragraph 3 above, certain prerequisites for the effective relaunching of the peace process and further approval of an extended and

expanded mandate for UNAVEM would need to be fulfilled. The Government and UNITA would need, inter alia:

(a) To reaffirm their commitment to respect and implement the Peace Accords for Angola;

(b) To recognize that the success or failure of any new attempt to implement the Peace Accords will depend first and foremost on their own actions;

(c) To reaffirm their previous commitments to a total cease-fire, including a halt to all offensive movements of troops and weapons;

(d) To reaffirm that the results of the 29/30 September 1992 elections stand as accepted by all parties;

(e) To reaffirm their declared desire for the United Nations to be given a larger and more active role in the Angolan peace process. They would recognize formally that this means the United Nations should be given the authority of mediator and supervisor;

(f) To commit themselves to respect the United Nations Mission in Angola, and to support and protect the Chief and all members of the Mission as well as United Nations installations and property;

(g) To accord to UNAVEM a role appropriate to its expanded mandate in the revised JPMC or alternative successor organization that may be decided between the parties;

(h) To agree that the campaign for the second round of the presidential election cannot begin until the tasks described in paragraph 8 (a) to (h) below have been declared by the United Nations as completed;

(i) To agree to a realistic and specific timetable for implementation of each of the tasks described below.

III. TASKS

8. The Government and UNITA would formally accept United Nations mediation and supervision and technical assistance in completion by them of the following nine basic tasks:

(a) Implementation of the cease-fire;

(b) The assembly and demobilization of both sides' troops;

(c) The collection, storage and custody of weapons, including those in civilian hands;

(d) The formation of the new, unified armed forces;

(e) The formation and supervision of a neutral, unified police force;

(f) The extension of the central administration to the entire country and assurance of the free circulation of people and goods;

(g) The release and exchange of prisoners (principally supervised by ICRC);

(h) Security for UNITA leaders and installations;

(i) The second round of presidential elections.

9. The basic functions to be assigned to the United Nations under each of these headings are outlined below. In some cases, options have been suggested, and a decision will be needed as to which should be selected. No figures for numbers of personnel have been given since these can be calculated only when agreement on the basic tasks has been reached.

A. Implementation of the cease-fire

10. United Nations military, police and civilian political offices would:

(a) Assist in reinstating the joint government/UNITA monitoring machinery;

(b) Monitor the cease-fire and investigate alleged violations of it;

(c) Mediate solutions to cease-fire problems at the national and local levels.

United Nations military, police and civilian officers would need to be deployed in all 18 provincial capitals, with air and land mobility. Until the cease-fire is firmly established and an effective and accepted police force is in place, the observers would need armed United Nations protection.

B. The assembly and demobilization of both sides' troops

11. This would entail the withdrawal and recantonment of troops in assembly areas; demobilization of all troops surplus to Angolan Armed Forces' requirements and their transportation to their respective provinces; and effective abolition of FAPLA and FALA.

12. United Nations military and civilian staff would:

(a) Mediate agreements on these tasks;

(b) Monitor assembly of troops and arms in the assembly areas;

(c) Arrange adequate logistic support for them.

Each side would have to provide an honest account of its order of battle, including civilians to whom arms have been issued during the recent crisis. They would also have to include information about which personnel had already been selected for the Angolan Armed Forces. On this basis, arrangements would have to be agreed for the immediate assembly of troops and arms not selected for the Angolan Armed Forces, with adequate arrangements for logistic support of the troops in the assembly areas and their earliest possible demobilization. Additional political staff could be required for mediating and for logistic support function. It would also be necessary to ensure that proper arrangements are in place for retraining programmes to facilitate the social and economic integration of those returning to civilian life.

C. Collection, storage and custody of weapons

13. Each side would have to provide an honest declaration of the weapons under their control. Armed United Nations infantry would supervise the storage of, and if necessary, guard, the arms brought into the assembly areas, and at central storage sites, until they are destroyed or transferred to the Angolan Armed Forces.

14. Arrangements would also have to be agreed for recovering at least some of the arms distributed to civilians, including perhaps a programme to collect weapons from civilians. The neutral, unified police force (see sect. E below) would need to be fully involved in this process.

D. Formation of the new unified Angolan Armed Forces

15. The formation of the Angolan Armed Forces would be undertaken by the Angolans themselves. The United Nations role would be to supervise the process. It would be mainly a management function, involving the assembly and direction of teams of foreign staff officers and instructors to help the parties set up and train the new Angolan Armed Forces, and coordinate the work of any foreign advisers they might invite bilaterally to assist them.

E. Formation and supervision of a neutral, unified police force

16. This process would require effective incorporation of UNITA and other non-MPLA elements into the neutral, unified police force, including into the anti-riot police.

17. United Nations police officers would supervise and monitor the establishment, training and operations of a new national police force, including the anti-riot police, for which personnel would be recruited from all Angolan parties and ethnic groups.

F. Extension of the Government's administration to the entire country and assurance of the free circulation of people and goods

18. In each province, United Nations civilian and police observers would monitor and supervise such extension and circulation. A small United Nations political staff would be required in each of the provinces. This could be facilitated if the Government agreed:

(a) To introduce, at an early date, legislation providing for provincial and municipal administrators to be elected by popular vote;

(b) To appoint, meanwhile, supporters of parties other than MPLA, and acceptable to the Government, to provincial and municipal administrations in areas where those parties won a majority in the recent legislative election.

G. Release and exchange of prisoners

19. As foreseen in the Peace Accords, this function would be coordinated and supervised by ICRC. The United Nations, as previously, would cooperate, as necessary and appropriate, in ensuring the release of all military and civilian prisoners still held, including all those taken during and after the 31 October/1 November fighting anywhere in Angola.

H. Security for UNITA leaders and installations

20. United Nations policy in such situations is that the primary responsibility for the security of all citizens in a country rests with the Government concerned. It is recognized, however, that the special circumstances prevailing in Angola require some additional measures. Various options may be considered, either singly or in a combination among several of them:

(a) Basic security provided by the Government;

(b) Agreement by the Government to allow the UNITA leadership to have a strictly limited number of armed bodyguards drawn from their supporters;

(c) Additional bodyguards provided by commercial security agencies;

(d) Close monitoring by United Nations civilian police observers to ensure that the UNITA bodyguards were not being used for unauthorized military activities and that the Government was meeting its own responsibilities for guaranteeing UNITA's security;

(e) A specialist armed unit provided by a Member State or the United Nations, such as a military police detachment trained in VIP protection (Note: this last would be a departure from normal United Nations practice and create a precedent that would need to be examined by the Security Council with particular care).

I. Second round of presidential elections

21. The United Nations role in the second round of the presidential elections should be greatly enlarged. Three options might be considered:

(a) Observation and verification on the same lines as for the first round of elections on 29 and 30 September, but with a far larger number of observers, and with UNAVEM possibly becoming a full member of the National Electoral Council;

(b) Supervision and control of the elections, as in Namibia, but stopping short of overall responsibility for their organization;

(c) Full responsibility for the organization and conduct of the elections as in Cambodia.

It should be emphasized, however, that the last two options would involve amendments to the Electoral Law, as well as a very large increase in resources, for which it would be difficult to obtain Security Council approval. The possibility of the Government of Angola making a substantial contribution to the electoral part of the new United Nations mission might be considered.

22. Whichever of the above options was chosen, the United Nations could again provide technical assistance and help the Government or the National Electoral Council (NEC) to obtain the necessary logistic and other support from external sources.